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Abstract: This paper analyses the complex relationship between work flexibility strategies 
and workplace training at the firm level, thus filling a gap in the relative literature that 
only takes into account supply-side factors and fails to discriminate between on- and off- 
the job training. To achieve this purpose, we discuss the implications of two different 
theoretical frameworks grounding on human capital theory and systemic flexibility, 
respectively, and go on developing alternative hypotheses on the association between 
the presence of temporary and part-time workers at firm-level and training investments, 
both off-the-job and on-the-job. By using data on Italian firms, we get different results 
according to the type of non-standard contract and training. Part-time and temporary 
contracts carry out distinct functions with respect to off-the-job and on-the-job training, 
respectively. The former is more consistent with the human capital approach, whereas 
the latter is in line with the strategic management approach. These results are discussed 
in view of a structural labour market reform enacted by the Italian government in 2015, 
the so-called “Jobs Act”. 
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In the last two decades, European countries delivered labour market re-
forms aimed at fostering the diffusion of flexible contracts as a mean to en-
hance work flexibility and boost employment rates. This transition may 
have negatively affected firms’ training decisions by reducing incentives to 
invest in human capital as flexible contracts usually have limited expected 
payback period for such investments. For the same reason, precarious 
workers are inhibited to actively participate to training programs and 
achieve the expected learning outcomes. Given that “training matters enor-
mously because of the importance of skill formation at work in a modern-
day economy” (Green et al., 2016) this possible trade-off has been related to 
the unsatisfactory growth of labour productivity in Italy and other Euro-
pean countries characterized by segmentation of labour markets (Bassanini 
et al., 2005), raising concerns on the sign of the relationship between work-
place training and the diffusion of flexible employment, notably part-time 
and temporary jobs.  
On theoretical grounds, two distinct approaches have been developed 
for the analysis of the interactions between training and firms' requirement 
of work flexibility. The first and dominant approach, at least in the domain 
of economics, is rooted in the human capital theory and its derivations and 
developments. The focus of these models is mainly on the conditions and 
the incentives that favour the financing of employees' training by the em-
ployer and/or by the employees themselves. In these models, labour flexi-
bility plays a key role by affecting the expected tenure of employees and, in 
this way, the time needed to pay back employers' investment in training. 
The second approach is based on the strategic management view of the 
firm. In this perspective, the firm is conceived as a complex system in which 
personnel practices interact one each other and can be understood only by 
taking into account the cobweb of relationships among different practices. 
Accordingly, training practices interact with work flexibility strategies and 
this complex relationship affects the employers' choices.  
An extensive strand of empirical literature has explored the relationship 
between flexible contracts and training investments from the supply-side, 
using information on household and individual workers. Conversely, few 
studies have investigated this effect from the labour demand standpoint, 
using firm-level data, despite the employers are the key decision makers for 
firm personnel and training policies. Moreover, most of these studies often 
nest together on-the-job and off-the-job training due to the unavailability of 
separate data. Yet, these two types of training are rather different in nature.  
The complex interplay between work flexibility strategies and manage-
rial policies towards workplace training deserves particular attention when 
reference is made to the Italian context. Like in many European countries, 
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the distinction between flexible and permanent employment has acquired 
relevance over the past decades further to a wave of institutional reforms 
that pursued flexibilization to favour labour market efficiency and increase 
labour supply (Barbieri et al., 2019). Further to these reforms, Italy has been 
considered a typical case of institutionally driven insider–outsider scenario 
(Palier and Thelen, 2010) in which the duality of the labour market mainly 
concerned the divide between permanent and fixed-term workers (Berton 
and Garibaldi, 2012), and to a more limited extent between part-time and 
full-time workers. During the same period, Italian labour productivity lev-
els significantly lagged behind those of other EU and OECD countries. This 
evidence has raised concerns on how to leverage on training investments to 
bridge the “productivity gap” that plagues Italy (Bugamelli et al., 2018; Cal-
ligaris et al., 2018). The consequent call to mitigate labour markets dualism 
in Italy paved the way for further institutional reforms, eventually leading 
to the adoption of the so-called “Jobs Act” in 2015. Such reform tried to re-
duce the gap between insiders and outsiders mainly by reducing legal em-
ployment protection associated with open-ended contracts, reducing the 
room for the applicability of atypical semi-independent contracts, and sub-
sidizing firms hiring fresh workers on a permanent basis. 
Against this background, the objective of this paper is twofold. First, it 
aims at shedding light on the relationship between workplace training and 
labour market flexibility practices in Italy after the enactment of the first 
wave of reforms (“enhancing flexibility reforms”). In particular, by assum-
ing that part-time and temporary workers represent the flexible tier of the 
workforce, we test a set of hypotheses stemming directly from the two the-
oretical approaches previously introduced by using cross-sectional firm-
level microdata. In this way, the paper fills a gap in the extant literature by 
focusing on demand-side decisions in terms of training policies and dis-
criminating between on- and off-the-job training (e.g., Forrier and Sels, 
2003). Second, it aims at discussing the potential changes to this relationship 
brough by the implementation of the “Jobs Act” to provide the basis for 
future empirical investigations on the effects of this recent reform on work-
place training.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the the-
oretical framework based on the human capital and the functional flexibility 
approach, respectively. Section 3 describes the two waves of institutional 
reforms that restructured the Italian labour market during the last two dec-
ades. Section 4 describes the dataset and defines the empirical strategy. Sec-
tion 5 presents the results. Section 6 paves the way for future research based 
on post-“Jobs Act” microdata. Section 7 concludes. 
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2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 Training Investments and Flexible Workers in the Human 
Capital Literature 
The human capital literature identifies two dichotomous types of train-
ing, general and specific, according to the degree of skills’ transferability 
(Becker, 1964). The skills developed through general training can be used 
by both current and future employers. Conversely, specific training gener-
ates benefits only in the current occupation and in the employing firm. In 
perfectly competitive markets, employers can share with employees the fi-
nancing of specific training, but they are not available to fund general train-
ing programmes. The employer’s availability to pay for employees’ training 
is related to her capability to capture a fraction of the economic rent gener-
ated by training. As a result, the availability to invest in training also de-
pends positively on the expected length of the employment relation. How-
ever, more recent economic developments in the realm of human capital 
theory found that, if one relaxes the assumption of perfectly competitive 
markets, employers can also find convenient the financing of general train-
ing (Katz and Ziderman, 1990; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999). A similar out-
come is achieved in presence of a mixed training intervention that allows 
the firm to partially recapture its general training outlays (see, Kessler and 
Luelfesmann; 2006; Brunello, 2001)  
Based on this theoretical framework one can discuss the relationship be-
tween the different typologies of labour contract and the provision of train-
ing. Definitely, if the employers’ availability to provide training is posi-
tively affected by the expected length of the employment relation, then one 
can expect that workers with open-ended contracts are more likely to re-
ceive training than workers with a fixed-term labour contract. This expec-
tation is even stronger for part-timers. The high share of workers involun-
tarily in a part-time employment reduces the expected tenure of this tier of 
the workforce. Moreover, they have less working hours to be allocated to 
learning activities. They are also less likely to cover core job positions due 
to their peculiar skill endowment that place them outside the full-time la-
bour market (Yamaguchi, 2012).  
Basically, according to the human capital theory, the role of these non-
standard employment contracts is to strengthen the firm's labour flexibility, 
minimising the amount of training attached to these contracts. Most of the 
empirical studies support the view that workers with open-ended contracts 
are more likely to receive training than non-standard ones (Oosterbeek, 
1996; Arulampalam and Booth, 1998; Forrier and Sels, 2003, Almeida-Santos 
and Mudford, 2004; Albert et al., 2005; Sauermann, 2006; O’Connell and 
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Byrne, 2012; Cabrales et al., 2014). Likewise, comparative analyses generally 
support the existence of a negative correlation between training opportuni-
ties and non-standard workers in European countries (Bassanini et al., 2005; 
European Commission, 2010; OECD, 2002). Yet, they show a statistically 
significant lower training probability for temporary and part-time workers 
with respect to a limited number of countries (Arulampalam et al., 2003; 
Albert et al., 2010). However, few studies have investigated this effect from 
the labour demand standpoint, despite the fact that the decision whether to 
train or not rests mainly on the employer, who usually finance the relevant 
investment. Some demand-side based studies examine related issues (e.g., 
Forrier and Sels, 2003b), but do not focus on non-standard employment nor 
they disentangle between part-time and temporary workers. Most of the 
existing evidence is therefore partially biased by the measurement error at-
tached to the distance between employers’ and employees’ responses re-
garding the provision of informal training and the intensity of formal train-
ing. 
2.2 The Job Competition Model and the Resource-based View of 
the Firm 
The job competition model (Thurow, 1975) is based on a set of assump-
tions, which differentiate radically it from the human capital theory. These 
assumptions concern both the operation of labour markets and the internal 
dynamics of firms. First, workers compete for jobs on the basis of a set of 
characteristics indicating their trainability. They do not compete on the level 
of wage which is exogenous with respect to the labour market. Wages do 
not react to excess supply of labour: their determination depends on the 
structure of the internal labour market and the internal organisation of 
work. Second, any job opening requires some form of training provided af-
ter the activation of the employment relation. In order to fill a vacancy, the 
employer positions the applicants along a queue, ranking them on the basis 
of a set of background characteristics such as education, previous working 
experience, age. These indicators are proxies of expected cost of training for 
the applicant in a specific and well-defined job position. These procedures 
of hiring carried out by firms may not be compatible with the target to pur-
sue static efficiency in the short-run, but in the medium-run they can favour 
the pursuit of dynamic efficiency, through a rise of labour productivity.  
The job competition approach is consistent with the view of skills for-
mation as a firm’s idiosyncratic process, devised within the resource-based 
view of the firm (Teece et al., 1997). The process of skill formation is a stra-
tegic tool in the hands of the firm's management for the pursuit of dynamic 
efficiency. In these approaches the firm is conceived as a system of interre-
lated and complementary techno-organisational practices. These practices 
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interact with one another and establish a network of complementary rela-
tionships. Applying this conception to personnel practices, this implies that 
positive complementarities among distinct workforce development prac-
tices can be set up. In this way, one has to take into account not only the 
single practice but also the coordinated operation of the overall bundle of 
practices (e.g., Ichniowski et al, 1997). Hence, the effects of the recourse to 
non-standard working arrangements such as part-time and/or fixed-term 
labour contracts depends on the interaction with the other job-related prac-
tices, within a frame of complementary relationships designed by the man-
agement. As a result, the effects of these two practices on the provision of 
training are not as clear-cut as in the human capital approach. Even though 
either part-timers or temps are hired just for mere numerical or payroll flex-
ibility purposes, the effect of either of these practices on training may be 
positive, contrarily to the prediction of the human capital theory. In fact, the 
adoption of either of these two practices brings about the segmentation of 
the internal labour market into two tiers, one stable and the other one un-
stable. The role of the unstable component is to provide flexibility and to 
structure the internal labour market so that the management can apply skill 
development measures to the employees with standard employment con-
tracts in order to contribute to smooth their firm-internal career (Sanders 
and de Grip, 2004) and cultivate a kernel of core competencies able to dif-
ferentiate the firm from the others (Green, 2013). In this way a positive re-
lation between either of these two practices and training of employees can 
be observed, despite employees with non-standard contracts do not benefit 
from any form of training. 
2.3 Distinguishing Between Off-the-job and On-the-job Training 
For both the approaches to the analysis of skill development the hetero-
geneity of skills’ portfolio is an important element in the economic analysis 
of training. Training can be distinguished between off-the-job and on-the-
job training. Off-the-job training is undertaken away from the work posi-
tion. It includes both the formal component of training provided through 
internally organized courses, and the whole range of external training pro-
vided by business schools, vocational and technical institutes, and consult-
ing companies. Although it is not possible to exactly separate in each train-
ing intervention the general component from the specific one, we can as-
sume that in external courses the development of general skills prevails 
(Booth and Bryan, 2002; O’Connell and Byrne, 2012).  
On-the-job training encompasses all the training practices taking place 
during working hours, very often in informal way. The range of on-the-job 
training practices is rather wide. It includes the learning of sophisticated 
techniques, developed in-house, but also the acquiring of specific 
Cattani, Guidetti, Pedrini: Work Flexibility and Workplace Training in Italy 
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knowledge related to menial tasks. This kind of training is expected to be 
mainly firm specific and can be viewed from two different perspectives. As 
a standing alone practice on-the-job training is characterized by short inter-
ventions attached to specific skills that may soon become obsolete. In such 
case the presence of non-standard employment should not penalize on-the-
job-training because this type of training is the main answer to the need for 
(initial) training and is provided to all employees indistinctly at the time of 
hiring. On the other hand, on-the-job training can be considered as a com-
ponent of a bundle of interrelated organisational practices that are designed 
to move towards high-performance strategies (Whitfield, 2000). This im-
plies that the presence of non-standard workers may lead to the adoption a 
wide set of mutually complementary and reinforcing job-related practices 
in the light of the higher heterogeneity of the workforce composition. Ad-
ditionally, on-the-job training can be quite informal, not systematic and dif-
ficult to monitor. Such characteristics can hamper the possibility to measure 
its actual intensity and bring about an underestimation of its effects on la-
bour productivity (Nordman and Hayward, 2006). For this reason, in most 
of the empirical studies on-the-job training is usually measured through a 
binary variable attached to the propensity to train rather than a continuous 
or discrete variable associated with training intensity.   
Following our theoretical reasoning we proceed to formulate the hypoth-
eses to be tested in the subsequent empirical analysis. Namely, we formu-
late two hypotheses, each of them related to a type of training and then di-
vided into two different statements: the first statement is related to the hu-
man capital approach, whereas the second statement derives from the sys-
temic approach to the analysis of the firm and its training practices. How-
ever, it is important to underline that each statement does not rule out the 
other one. 
First, we can expect a relatively lower provision of off-the-job training in 
presence of a large buffer of flexible and easily replaceable workers. A 
higher job instability would be associated with a shorter expected duration 
for the firm to recover training investments. Ceteris paribus, this would lead 
to a lower intensity of off-the-job training at firm level. This expected corre-
lation is deemed to be stronger in presence of part-time workers due to their 




Resorting to flexible employment is negatively associated with off-the-job train-
ing intensity. This relationship is stronger in presence of part-time workers rather 
than temporary ones. (Human capital approach) 
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However, once considering the different dimensions of flexibility, and 
considering the firm as a cobweb of interconnected organisational arrange-
ments, one can claim that training practices and attempts to intensify the 
numerical flexibility are complementary and can reinforce each other. Firms 
employing a relatively high share of temporary workers may hoard perma-
nent workers with high tenure, even in case of recessions, and provide sub-
stantial amounts of training to this core group of employees to meet their 
skill improvement needs. In this way a positive association between the 




Off-the-job training intensity is positively associated with the presence of flexible 
workers. This relationship is stronger in presence of temporary workers rather than 
part-time ones. (Flexibility approach)  
 
The human capital approach does not predict, instead, a univocal rela-
tion between non-standard employment and the provision of on-the-job 
training. In fact, if we consider a simple two-period model we can claim that 
firm's propensity to provide on-the-job training depends on the time distri-
bution of the benefits accruing to the organization. If such benefits are con-
centrated in the initial period, the presence of flexible workers is should not 
affect off-the-job training investments, not on-the-job training decisions of 
the employers. Similarly, if on-the-job training is associated with the initial 
training providing to fresh employees, one can expect that the presence of 
non-standard staffing practices does not affect significantly on-the-job 
training decision.  
 
Hypothesis 2a 
Resorting to flexible employment is not associated with the propensity to invest 
in on-the-job training (Human capital approach) 
 
On the other hand, for the same reasons as those outlined for off-the-job 
training, one can assert that on-the-job training and numerical flexibility can 
be positively associated. Employers can respond to new skills requirements, 
by providing further on-the-job training to the stable tier of the workforce.  
This argument is reinforced if on-the-job training and off-the-job training 
are complementary.  
 
Hypothesis 2b 
Resorting to flexible employment is positively associated with the propensity to 
invest in on-the-job training. (Flexibility approach)  
Cattani, Guidetti, Pedrini: Work Flexibility and Workplace Training in Italy 
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3 Labour Market Reforms and Flexible Employment 
in Italy: Main Regulatory Interventions. 
3.1 Enhancing-Flexibility Reforms (1997-2003) and its 
Consequences 
Italy has been fully involved in the process of increasing dualization of 
the labour markets that characterized all Western Economies during the last 
decades. Since the early 1990s, in fact, extensive two-tier reforms have been 
implemented in this Mediterranean country as well (Boeri, 2011; Berton and 
Garibaldi, 2012). Following the enactment of laws 196/1997, 368/2001 and 
30/2003, the pre-existing rules that had limited the use of fixed-term and 
part-time contracts were substantially relaxed (Berton et al., 2013). This re-
formatory process led to a wider use of temporary and part-time contracts 
by the employers and eventually to the adoption of a two-tier employment 
protection regime (Ordine and Rose, 2016).  
Due to the increasing diffusion of flexible employment, especially among 
disadvantaged cohorts and social groups, two-tier reforms have been in-
creasingly criticised (Barbieri et al., 2019). In particular, they have been 
called into question when trying to explain the productivity slowdown that 
plagued Italy over the same period (Calligaris et al., 2018). Namely, the fact 
that this flexibilization of employment protection schemes was not accom-
panied by policies intended to favour a participation expansion of work-
force in training activities during the transition phase from one job to an-
other one (i.e., active labour policies) is often cited as a major explanatory 
argument of this productivity drop (Capellari et al., 2012). In addition, la-
bour market segmentation usually has a negative impact on firm-provided 
training due to the higher job volatility of flexible employment relationships 
(Cabrales et al., 2014). However, data concerning employees’ participation 
in training activities shows controversial evidence when reference is made 
to the Italian labour force. 
3.2 The Reform of the Labour Market in the Jobs Act  
Increasing awareness concerning the shortcomings of two-tier reforms 
led scholars and policy makers to elaborate innovative reform proposals to 
rationalize employment protection, expand active labour market policies 
application and enhance the effectiveness of social protection schemes 
(Boeri and Garibaldi, 2008; Cahuc, 2012; Blanchard and Tirole, 2008). Fol-
lowing a decade-long political debate on the matter, the Italian Government 
eventually intervened in 2015, by enacting the Legislative Decree 23/2015 
(so-called Jobs Act). The Jobs Act (henceforth JA), issued by the Italian gov-
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ernment in 2015, is one of the most radical and thorough reform of the la-
bour market approved in these last 20 years. For our interests it is important 
to briefly outline four different items which have been addressed and put 
into act. 
 
1. JA reforms the standard open-ended employment contract. Particularly, 
it significantly eases the procedure of employees' firing with the intro-
duction of a refunding (severance) payment for termination, which is 
supposed to be proportional to the employees' seniority; 
2. JA aims at discouraging the use of atypical employment contracts, such 
as semi-independent and bogus self-employed, by abolishing the so-
called co-co-pro (contratti di collaborazione a progetto, in Italian); 
3. JA eases the binds to change in the range of tasks that the worker has to 
carry out; 
4. JA attempts to reform public employment services through the introduc-
tion of the National Agency for Labour Active Policies. 
 
3.2.1 Preliminary Evidence on the Effects of the Jobs Act in the 
Economic Literature 
By potentially influencing the demand for flexible workers as well as the 
total cost of permanent employees, the introduction of JA is expected to af-
fect the relationship between workforce composition and training invest-
ments at firm level in a threefold way. First, relaxing firing restrictions may 
reduce workers’ bargaining power, thus “favouring the shift towards cost-
competitiveness strategies instead of technological ones based on invest-
ments, training and organizational innovation” (Cirillo et al., 2017, 216). 
Second, the projected reduction of flexible employment associated with the 
increase of permanent contracts (Sestito and Viviano, 2016) may provide 
firms with higher incentives to train their workers if one considers training 
as a firm-specific investment that implies sunk costs and a substantial time 
span between the time of the investment itself and the period of investment 
returns. Third, JA may affect training investments by modifying the rela-
tionship between the different types of labour flexibility (Catalano and Pez-
zolla, 2017). 
4 The Empirical Analysis  
4.1 Dataset and Descriptive Statistics 
In absence of available data relative to the post-JA period, we carried out 
an empirical analysis referred to the previous institutional stage, called “en-
Cattani, Guidetti, Pedrini: Work Flexibility and Workplace Training in Italy 
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hancing-flexibility”. In this way we get evidence on the relationship be-
tween training and flexibility potentially changed by the enactment of the 
JA. It is particularly useful to analyise the extent to which different employ-
ment relationship types and working arrangements differently impact on 
training possibilities as a significant increase of the share of workers em-
ployed either with a fixed-term contract (CNEL, 2021) or based on part-time 
work arrangements (Cirillo et al., 2017) took place in the aftermath of the JA 
reform. For this investigation we use data from the Survey on employee 
training in Italian firms performed by the National Institute of Statistics 
(ISTAT) in 2006 (reference year 2005) and released in 2012. The survey was 
delivered to a representative sample of firms employing more than 10 em-
ployees, which has been weighted with respect to the population according 
to the characteristics of the non-respondents of the targeted sample (52.1%). 
These data allow us to distinguish off-the-job from on-the-job training, and 
to disentangle non-standard workforce between part-time, and temporary 
workforce. Temporary employment is measured through the presence of 
workers on “non-training temporary contracts” which refer to any fixed-
term contracts that contain no mandatory training clause (Devicienti et al., 
2018). This definition excludes not only apprentices, whose contracts are 
extremely different from the other ones in the Italian regulatory setting, but 
also workers on training and work contracts and job insertion contracts. 
Part-time employment includes those individuals that are required to work 
for the firm less than 30 hours per week. Data also provide different proxies 
of off-the-job training intensity: hours/days of training per employee, the 
number (or the proportion) of trained employees, training costs, and the 
content of training activity. Among the 15,470 surveyed firms 6,439 (41.6%) 
provide some kind of off-the-job firm-sponsored training (either internal or 
external). On the other hand, 2,533 firms (16.3%) provide on-the-job training 
(defined as a scheduled period of training, learning or practical experience 
to be carried out on the site or in the work situation), but 88.9% of them is 
also engaged in off-the-job training. Overall, 43.45% of the firms are en-
gaged in some form of training while. 2,128 (14.55%) have provided both. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on training incidence and intensity, and 
employment structure. The share of workers that participate in training ac-
tivities is 40.75% for off-the-job training and 29.03% for on-the-job-training. 
Off-the-job training intensity is also low, amounting to 11.6 hours per em-
ployee per year, while yearly training costs amount to 576 Euro per em-
ployee. In terms of contents, off-the-job training can be considered as mostly 
general, as expected. Almost the totality of off-the-job training firms devel-
ops some kind of general skills (96%), while specific contents are provided 
by 62% of the sample. 
General training also prevails in terms of intensity: on average, in the 
respective subsamples, only 4.8 hours out of 13.6 can be considered as spe-
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS Vol. 12, Issue 1, Spring 2021, Article 3 
 
2021 University of Perugia Electronic Press. 
 
12 
cific while general contents count for more than 9 hours out of 11.7. Fur-
thermore, descriptive statistics show that most of training firms employ 
non-standard workers. In half of the cases, they employ both types of work-
ers, while 20.26% of them do not employ any. Few firms, however, offer 
training interventions that are specifically targeted for these types of work-
ers (3.47% for part-time workers and 7.81% for temporary workers). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 All firms Training firms 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Employment structure        
Number of employees (EMPL) 15,470 135.9729 85.4404 6,721 262.239 1280.129 
Proportion of males (MALES) 15,470 0.7104 0.2621 6,721 0.7136 0.2385 
Proportion of young workers 
(YOUNG_WORK) 
15,470 0.0631 0.0984 6,721 0.0605 0.0901 
Proportion of old workers 
(OLD_WORK) 
15,470 0.0747 0.0890 6,721 0.0705 0.0799 
Quantity of labour        
Working hours per employee 
(WORK_HOURS) 
15,470 1,592 312.7367 6,721 1,612 286.5265 
Labour costs       
Labour cost per employee 
(LAB_COST_EMPL)  
15,470 31,391 14,325 6,721 36,544 16,318 
Labour costs per hour 
(LAB_COST_HOUR) 
15,470 19.980 9.2432 6,721 23.027 10.7356 
Training incidence       
Off-the-job train (OFF_TRAIN) 6,439 0.416     
On-the-job train (ON_TRAIN) 2,533 0.164     
At least one type  6,721 0.435     
Both types  2,251 0.146     
Off-the-job training intensity       
Hours per employees 
(OFF_HOURS)   
   5,986 11.667 17.6437 
Cost per employee 
(COST_EMPL) 
   5,986 576.918 880.6824 
Participation rate (OFF_PART)    5,986 0.407 0.3661 
On-the-job training intensity       
On-the-job participation rate 
(ON_PART) 
   5,986 0.290 0.2862 
Off-the-job training intensity       
Hours per employees 
(OFF_HOURS)   
   5,986 11.667 17.6437 
Cost per employee 
(COST_EMPL) 
   5,986 576.918 880.6824 
Participation rate (OFF_PART)    5,986 0.407 0.3661 
On-the-job training intensity       
On-the-job participation rate 
(ON_PART) 
   5,986 0.290 0.2862 
Non-standard employment        
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Presence of temporary 
workers (TEMP) 
   5,986 0.599 - 
Presence of part-time 
workers (P_TIME) 
   5,986 0.688 - 
Number of apprentices 
(APPR) 
   5,986 4.602 22.500 
Organization        
Training department 
(TR_DEP) 
   5,986 0.382 - 
Training responsible 
(TR_RESP) 
   5,986 0.621 - 
Training plan (TR_PLAN)    5,986 0.552 - 
Training budget (TR_BUDG)    5,986 0.398 - 
Contract clauses related to 
training (TR_CLAUS) 
   5,986 0.272 - 
Trade unions’ involvement 
(UN_INV)  
   5,986 0.309 - 
Evaluation of training 
effectiveness  
      
Trainees’ satisfaction 
(WORK_SAT) 
   5,986 63.08 - 
Learning achievements 
(LEARN_ACH) 
   5,986 28.80 - 
Workers’ performance 
(WORK_PERF) 
   5,986 51.84 - 
Organisational performance 
(ORG_PERF) 
   5,986 29.29 - 
Content of training courses 
(Hours per employees) 
      
Technical      5,986 3.770 12.230 
Marketing     5,986 0.985 4.542 
Managerial     5,986 1.788 5.957 
IT     5,986 1.281 6.137 
Administrative     5,986 2.274 6.880 
Foreign languages    5,986 0.896 3.556 
Job-related practices        
Job rotation (JOB_ROT)    5,986 7.91  
Quality circles (QUAL_CIRC)    5,986 2.98  
Self-learning (SELF_LEARN)    5,986 3.98  
 
The existence of a correlation between off-the-job and on-the-job training 
is supported by the analysis of Pearson coefficients (0.42). Other correlation 
coefficients are reported in Table 2.  
As expected, the correlation between training variables is positive, alt-
hough in the majority of the case the magnitude is poor. A major overlap 
only emerges between the propensity to provide on-the-job training and the 
presence of at least one job-related practice. Thus, it is meaningful to jointly 
analyse on-the-job training and job-related practices. On the other hand, the 
presence of part-time and temporary workers is positively correlated, as ex-
pected. 
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Table 2. Pairwise Correlations 
Id Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 EMPL 1.00        
2 P_TIME 0.10 1.00       
3 TEMP 0.11 0.34 1.00      
4 UNSKIL 0.10 0.20 0.28 1.00     
5 OFF_HOURS  0.83 0.08 0.08 0.07 1.00    
6 OFF_PART 0.03 0.08 0.01 -0.04 0.09 1.00   
7 ON_PROP 0.09 -0.01 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.15 1.00  
8 JOB-PRACT 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.30 0.71 1.00 
4.2 Empirical Strategy 
In order to assess the relationship between workplace training and non-
standard employment, we estimate two econometric models where off-the-
job training intensity (Offint) and on-the-job training propensity (Onprop) 
depends on the use of non-standard contracts at a firm level. Following 
Green et al. (2015) on the misleadingness of the use of participation rate, 
Offint is measured through the length of courses expressed in hours per year 
per employee. Onprop is a binary variable that takes the value one if the firm 
has provided training in 2005 and zero otherwise. 
To measure the diffusion of temporary and part-time workers, we use 
two dummy variables taking the value of unity if the firm employs either 
temporary (Temp) or part-time (Ptime) contracts, respectively, and zero oth-
erwise. In all the models we introduce a horizontal vector of control varia-
bles (X) related to several workplace characteristics at firm level that have 
been commonly found as determinants of training propensity and intensity: 
size, employment structure (gender and age), propensity to innovate, in-
dustry dummies (“other industries” is the benchmark), trade union recog-
nition, and the organization of training activity. Rationale for this selection 
is supported by both theoretical and empirical literature. Large firms may 
be better able to bear the risk associated with investments in general train-
ing (Goux and Maurin, 2000) while achieving economies of scale in the pro-
vision of specific training (O’Connell, 2007), and are more likely to report 
the presence of temporary and/or part-time worker in their workforce. 
Gender and age may affect the employer’s willingness to train as well as 
training intensity. In particular women are less-likely be offered formal on-
the-job training than men (Evertsson, 2004), while older workers are less 
likely to be offered job-related training due to their lower expected payoff 
(Gelderblom and de Koning, 2006). On the contrary, the younger the 
worker, the higher the expected return from training, both for the firm and 
the individual. The propensity to innovate is also expected to be positively 
related to training and other job-related practices (Gashi et al., 2010). In line 
with our theoretical framework, a positive relationship between the adop-
Cattani, Guidetti, Pedrini: Work Flexibility and Workplace Training in Italy 
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/330 15 
tion of job-related practices and training intensity is assumed to be in place 
(Whitfield, 2000). Finally, the role of trade unions and firm-level contract 
clauses in the training decision-making process are also expected to be as-
sociated with increased training intensity (Groot, 1999) as well as all varia-
bles concerning training organization and evaluation procedures (O’Con-
nell, 2007). In specifying the econometric model for estimating Offint, we 
have to control for potential selection effects deriving from the observation 
of the dependent variable only for firms providing training (Offprop=1). 
Heckman’s sample selection model is one of the standard procedures for 
treating this bias. However, this method is acceptable only if the dataset 
provides variables that can be used to identify the sample selection term. 
Since the variables available in our dataset cannot address this issue a mul-
ticollinearity problem is likely to arise. We thus apply a subsample OLS es-
timator following Puhani’s (2000) approach to the following log-linear spec-
ification. 
 
ln (𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 if  𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇 = 1  (1) 
 
The second model estimates the probability distribution of Ontrain con-
ditioned on Offprop, as a function of the same covariates1. In this case, the 
dataset contains two potential exclusion restrictions: working hours per em-
ployees and the amount of compulsory social contributions paid to the State 
to finance vocational courses. These variables are likely to affect the decision 
to provide off-the-job training without influencing Ontrain. On the one 
hand, working hours per employee may affect Offprop by increasing the op-
portunity cost of off-the-job training, whereas it is not expected to be corre-
lated with Ontrain because on-the-job training take place in the job post and 
does not make workers lose working hours. On the other hand, training-
related social contributions may induce firms to reduce training programs 
(which can only be off-the-job) and avoid such cost without influencing the 
decision to provide on-the-job training because the latter is not financed by 
social contributions. These insights are supported by a test on their exoge-
neity that excludes the direct influence of these variables on the main equa-
tion. Accordingly, we decide to use the following probit model with sample 
selection (heckprobit) that jointly estimates the following ML functions. 
 
                                                 
1  We use this econometric technique due to the structure of the questionnaire 
administered to firms. In fact, data about part-time, temporary workers, on-the-job 
training are available only for firms providing off-the-job training and not for all the 
firms of the sample. 
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𝑃𝑃(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽1 + σ12λ(𝑍𝑍′𝑂𝑂𝛽𝛽2) +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 > 0)            (2) 
𝑃𝑃(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 1)= P(Z’iβ2 + γi ) 
 
Where λ(𝑍𝑍′𝑂𝑂𝛽𝛽2) is the inverse Mills ratio and σ12 is the covariance be-
tween εi and γi, while β2 is obtained by the probit regression of Offprop on 
the vector of covariates Z’i that identify the selection equation. This estimate 
is then controlled for selection in observables using propensity score match-
ing technique (PSM) for three treatment variables: Ptime, Temp, and Un-
skilled. After checking that the common support condition is satisfied across 
more than 95% of treatment and comparison groups, we create matched 
“treatment” and “control” samples being identical in every other observa-
ble respect. Our choice in this respect is to use the kernel matching proce-
dure in view of its capability to maximize precision without worsening bias, 
while nearest neighbours technique is used as a robustness check. If match-
ing is sufficiently good, differences in the propensity to provide on-the-job 
training can be used as estimates of the effect of employing either non-
standard or unskilled workers on this outcome variable. (Garrido et al., 
2014). As a further robustness check to address the potential endogeneity of 
the main explanatory variables due to reverse causality we also run addi-
tional estimates by using the 1-year lagged value of Onprop as the depend-
ent variable. 
5 Results 
In this section we discuss the empirical evidence by separately testing the 
hypotheses worked out in Section 2. Since the empirical analysis relies on 
cross-sectional data its main limitation concerns the reduced capability to 
address the endogeneity of non-standard employment with respect to train-
ing provision. Accordingly, the discussion of the results focuses on the cor-
relation between training practices and non-standard employment. 
In Table 3 one can observe that the diffusion of non-standard employ-
ment is divergently associated with off-the-job training according to the 
type of contract. In all specifications, Ptime is negatively related to Offint. 
This evidence confirms Hypothesis 1a with respect to part-time contracts. 
Conversely, the relationship between Temp and Offint is positive in the first 
specification of the model estimated. Firms employing temporary workers 
provide on average 7% more training than those firms that do not employ 
this type of workers (+21% if considering the relationship with 1-year 
lagged probability to provide off-the-job training - see Table A.1 in the Ap-
pendix). However, the coefficient is not significant across our additional 
specifications. Basically, there is some weak evidence that firms employing 
temporary workers increase their provision of off-the-job-training in order 
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to protect a core group of workers from demand fluctuations, which is con-
sistent with Hypothesis 1b. Different results emerge from the estimate of 
the probability to provide on-the-job training adjusted for sample selection 
bias (Table 4). In all specifications Ptime and Temp are not significantly re-
lated to Onprop. The same occurs when using 1-year lagged Onprop as de-
pendent variable (Table A.1. in the Appendix). 
This result is confirmed by the non-significant effect (ATT) of Ptime and 
Temp when they are used as treatment variables in a PSM estimate with the 
same covariates of the baseline specification of our regression (Table 5 and 
Table A.2. in the Appendix). 
Results are thus consistent with a scenario in which non-standard em-
ployment does not penalize the provision of on-the-job training, plausibly 
because on-the-job training does not require long time to recover its total 
costs (Hypothesis 2a). On the contrary, we do not find any evidence sup-
porting Hypothesis 2b. 
To assess the quality of the matching, we estimate the differences be-
tween the mean values of a subset of the covariates which are used to match 
the treatment and control groups (see Table A.3 in the Appendix). Overall, 
our treatment and comparisons appear to be rather similar after the match-
ing, with no significant statistical differences in the means of the reported 
values. 
6 Few Hints about the Possible Effects of the Jobs Act 
on Flexibility and Training 
Our evidence supports the idea that work flexibility differently impacts 
different types of workplace training. 
Namely, firms implementing work flexibility practices based on part-
time working arrangements negatively affects off-the-job training and does 
not play a significant role in shaping on-the-job training decisions. This 
evidence is consistent with the human capital explanation which implies 
that unstable employment relationships reduce firms’ incentives to invest 
in human capital formation. On the other hand, when work flexibility is 
implemented through establishing a buffer of non-standard temporary 
workers within the firms, we find mixed evidence of a positive impact on 
off-the-job training activities. This evidence is consistent with the flexibility 
approach explanation, according to which a higher work flexibility allows 
employers to allocate the most suitable workers to training activities thus 
expanding participation into such activities by creating a group of core 
workers to be protected from demand-side fluctuations by the above said 
buffer of replaceable workers. 
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Table 3. Relationship Between Workforce Characteristics and Off-the-job Training 









P_TIME -0.142** -0.156*** -0.080** -0.091** 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.037) (0.036) 
TEMP 0.07* 0.063 0.038 0.033 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.035) (0.034) 
IMMIGRANTS -0.295*** -0.288*** -0.241*** -0.237*** 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.034) (0.034) 
COST_HOUR -0.789*** -0.779*** -0.790*** -0.786*** 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.035) (0.035) 
SIZE -0.110*** -0.144*** -0.174*** -0.197*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.020) (0.020) 
UNSKIL 0.153* 0.126 0.006 -0.014 
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.037) (0.036) 
LAB_COST_HOUR 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
OLD_WORK -1.307*** -1.287*** -0.895*** -0.882*** 
 (0.283) -0.279 -0.184 -0.182 
YOUNG_WORK 0.104 0.09 0.123 0.119 
 (0.257) -0.254 -0.169 -0.169 
FEMALES -0.249* -0.202 -0.309*** -0.289*** 
 (0.124) -0.122 -0.081 -0.081 
INNOVATIVENESS 0.276*** 0.210*** 0.219*** 0.175*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.033) (0.033) 
JOB_ROT  0.280***  0.194*** 
  (0.064)  -0.041 
QUAL_CIRC  0.434***  0.232*** 
  (-0.100)  -0.056 
SELF_LEARN  0.632***  0.529*** 
  (0.086)  -0.05 
TR_PLAN   0.330*** 0.311*** 
   (0.037) (0.037) 
TR_BUDG   0.360*** 0.345*** 
   (0.039) (0.039) 
WORK_SAT   0.047** 0.039* 
   (0.016) (0.016) 
LEARN_ACH   0.076*** 0.066*** 
   (0.017) (0.016) 
WORK_PERF   0.015 0.012 
   (0.016) (0.016) 
TR_CLAUS    -0.016 -0.019 
   (0.037) (0.036) 
UN_INV   -0.078* -0.083* 
   (0.034) (0.034) 
CONST 4.559*** 4.491*** 4.183*** 4.205*** 
 (0.222) (0.219) (0.144) (0.142) 
Industrial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5986 5986 5986 5986 
R2 0.162 0.188 0.242 0.261 
The overall sample is restricted to firms that provided off-the-job training in 2005. Training 
intensity is measured in hours per employee per year (log). 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4. Relationship Between Workforce Characteristics and Firm’s Propensity to 
Provide On-the-job Training (HeckProbit estimates – marginal effects) 









 P_TIME 0.0128 0.0065 0.0167 0.0085  
  (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0244) (0.0245)  
 TEMP 0.0201 0.0199 0.0076 0.0104  
  (0.0235) (0.0237) (0.0233) (0.0232)  
 IMMIGRANTS 0.0215 0.0196 0.0255 0.0234  
  (0.0242) (0.0244) (0.0237) (0.0237)  
 COST_HOUR -0.0362 -0.0290 -0.0357 -0.0300  
  (0.0230) (0.0233) (0.0228) (0.0230)  
 SIZE 0.0418** 0.0397* 0.0304 0.0324  
  (0.0512) (0.0203) (0.0197) (0.0197)  
 UNSKIL 0.0455* 0.0257 0.0367 0.0210  
  (0.0260) (0.0267) (0.0264) (0.0266)  
 LAB_COST_HOUR -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0009  
  (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0014)  
 OLD_WORK -0.2312 -0.2146 -0.2283 -0.2056  
  (0.1404) (0.1431) (0.1450) (0.1455)  
 YOUNG_WORK -0.0741 -0.1188 -0.0554 -0.0991  
  (0.3132) (0.1187) (0.1191) (0.1150)  
 FEMALES -0.1732*** -0.1761*** -0.1714*** -0.1742***  
  (0.0589) (0.0566) (0.0574) (0.0555)  
 INNOVATIVENESS 0.0990*** 0.0729*** 0.0871*** 0.0669***  
  (0.0286) (0.0276) (0.0260) (0.0251)  
 JOB_ROT  0.4328***  0.3933***  
   (0.0301)  (0.0328)  
 QUAL_CIRC  0.1866***  0.1429***  
   (0.0411)  (0.0394)  
 SELF_LEARN  0.1621***  0.1304***  
   (0.0418)  (0.0408)  
 TR_PLAN   0.1693*** 0.1482***  
    (0.0243) (0.0250)  
 TR_BUDG   -0.0208 -0.0186  
    (0.0259) (0.0259)  
 WORK_SAT   -0.0009 0.0018  
    (0.0106) (0.0107)  
 LEARN_ACH   0.0331*** 0.0276**  
    (0.0109) (0.0113)  
 WORK_PERF   0.0687*** 0.0557***  
    (0.0108) (0.0109)  
 TR_CLAUS    -0.0506* -0.0543**  
    (0.0272) (0.0276)  
 UN_INV   0.0008 -0.0110  
    (0.0242) (0.0238)  
 CONST 0.2411 -0.115 -0.4013 -0.6556*  
  (0.3203) (0.3548) (0.3531) (0.3772)  
 athrho -0.3920*** -0.2868* -0.3058** -0.2048  
  (0.146) (0.1589) (0.150) (0.1589)  
Industrial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 N 14884 14884 14884 14884  
 chi2 90.11 317.97 224.13 418.85  
The overall sample is restricted to 14,884 observations due to missing data. Uncensored 
observations are 5,914. Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5. On-the-job Training Propensity Scores of Temporary and Part-time Tiers of the 
Workforce  
Variable  N ATT s.e. t-stat 
TEMP      
 Treated 2400 0.0166 0.0187 0.89 
 Controls 3586    
P-TIME      
 Treated 1867 0.0065 0.0216 0.3 
 Controls 4119    
Propensity scores are estimated through a logistic function by using a kernel matching algorithm. 
The function includes the covariates reported in the first specification of Table 4. 
 
However, this evidence is not robust to different specifications compared 
to the baseline model and further research is needed to assess its scope of 
validity. We can derive policy implications and hypotheses concerning the 
impact of the JA reform on the Italian labour market starting from this 
evidence. 
In fact, JA policy goals were substantially two. First, JA aimed at mitigat-
ing the dualistic structure of the Italian labour market based on the divide 
between the employees with open-ended employment contract. Secondly, 
JA aimed at introducing flexicurity practices in the operation of the Italian 
labour market. This result can be accomplished only through a mix of com-
plementary interventions on both the system of unemployment benefits 
and the retraining interventions encompassed within the labour active pol-
icies. In addition to a thorough retraining scheme, these policies should fea-
ture an efficient labour supply and demand matching system.  
As far as work flexibility is concerned, mixed evidence emerges. Truly, 
the number of open-ended hirings has been rising since the approval of the 
JA and in the same lapse of time the incidence of self-employment has de-
creased. However, two counterfactual stylised facts can be observed. First, 
the contraction of self-employment has started well before the implementa-
tion of the JA (OECD, Employment Outlook, various years). Second, the in-
cidence of temporary employment has carried on its steady rise after the 
enacting of the Jobs Act (OECD, Data Warehouse).  
Based on the empirical evidence highlighted in this study, we can postu-
late that JA impacted differently on on- and off- the job training, further 
discriminating between firms resorting to different work flexibility strate-
gies in human resource management, i.e., part-time working arrangements, 
and temporary employment. As both fixed-term and part-time contracts in-
creased following the enactment of JA, this reform may have triggered a 
double effect on decisions concerning workplace training at a firm level. On 
the hand, resorting to higher shares of part-timers is suitable to decrease the 
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probability that firm will provide training opportunities to employees be-
cause of falling incentives to do so (i.e., falling probability to benefit of re-
turns to human capital investments). On the other hand, a higher share of 
non-standard temporary workers is suitable to facilitate investments in hu-
man capital according to the work flexibility approach explanation. Em-
ployers may benefit from work flexibility by efficiently allocating to train-
ing activities only the more suitable workers. Which of these two effects 
prevails is a matter of dispute and further research is needed to disentangle 
these opposite effects. 
7 Conclusions  
This paper analyses the complex relationship between work flexibility 
strategies and workplace training at the firm level, thus filling a gap in the 
relative literature that only takes into account supply-side factors and fails 
to discriminate between on- and off- the job training. To do this, we use data 
from a specific survey held by ISTAT prior to the enactment of the JA reform 
to test whether non-standard working arrangements (usually associated 
with work flexibility strategies in human resource management policies) 
differently impact on on- and off- the job training. Unfortunately, the cross-
sectional nature of the data does not allow a thorough discussion of possible 
causal links between the variables of interest by fully addressing the selec-
tivity of training firms. Keeping this limitation in mind, our empirical find-
ings contribute to the existing knowledge on this topic by showing that the 
relationship between flexible employment and firms’ training decisions is 
markedly heterogeneous across contract types and forms of training. Nota-
bly, we find that temporary and part-time contracts perform different func-
tions from the firm’s standpoint. Not only this result suggests that flexible 
contracts play a pivotal role in the process of segmentation of internal la-
bour markets, but also that, in doing so, they may facilitate the processes of 
skill development in firms. In addition to its well-known role in short-term 
adjustment of the labour force, each non-standard employment contract 
carries out its own specific function in the organisation of both work and 
training in firms.  
The empirical evidence does not clarify, however, if the observed rela-
tionship between training and flexible contracts arises as a result of the in-
stitutional setting or as an outcome of the heterogeneity of training. The im-
plementation of the Jobs Act may be helpful in clarifying this point as it 
represents a major labour market reforms potentially changing both the in-
siders/outsiders divide and, more generally, the room for work flexibility 
practices. As far as this study is concerned, the implications of our evidence 
on the post-JA period are mixed. On the one hand, the increase of the share 
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of part-timers following the JA reform may have hampered investments on 
training as firms lack the incentives (i.e., benefits of returns to human capital 
investments) to do so. On the other hand, a higher proportion of workers 
employed with fixed-term contracts may facilitate firms in efficiently allo-
cating training opportunities only to more suitable workers thus leading to 
a possible increase of either on- and off- the job training. Whether the former 
or the latter effect prevails is a matter of scrutiny for further applied re-
search, which will hopefully provide valuable policy implications for the 
debate on future labour market reforms. 
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Table A.1. Probit Estimates of 1-year Lagged Propensity to Provide Off-the-job and On-
the-job Training (Marginal Effects) 
 Off-the-job training (1) On-the-job training (2) 
part time -0.1291 -0.005 
 (0.0818) (0.020) 
temporary  0.2101*** 0.020 
 (0.0751) (0.019) 
Industrial dummies Yes Yes 
N 5914 5914 
chi2 287.49 5.38  
(1) The overall sample is restricted to firms that provided off-the-job training in 2005. Training 
intensity is measured in hours per employee per year (log). Sample selection bias is addresses 
through a two-step specification (Heckprobit). Control variables are the same of the fourth 
specification of Table 4.  
(2) The overall sample is restricted to firms that provided off-the-job training in 2005. Control 
variables are the same of the fourth specification of Table 3.  
Standard errors in parentheses. Control variables are the same of the fourth specification of 
Table 3 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A.2. 1-year Lagged On-the-job Training Propensity Scores of Temporary and 
Part-time Workers  
Variable  N ATT s.e. t-stat 
Temporary      
 Treated 2400 0.0372 0.0204 1.82 
 Controls 3586    
Part-time      
 Treated 1867 0.0753 0.0237 3.18 
 Controls 4119    
Propensity scores are estimated through a logistic function by using a kernel matching 
algorithm. The function includes the covariates reported in the first specification of Table 4. 
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Table A.3. Quality of Matching Procedure  
 Mean  T test  
Variable Treated Control %bias t p>|t| V(T)/V(C) 
immigrants 0.66067 0.65869 0.4 0.13 0.9 . 
size 1.9645 1.9402 3.1 0.9 0.369 0.98 
part-time 0.8287 0.82278 1.4 0.47 0.637 . 
temporary 0.80306 0.78904 3.1 1.05 0.292 . 
training cost/ 
hour (log) 52.333 52.077 0.8 0.25 0.806 1.07 
labour costs 36090 35871 1.4 0.47 0.638 1.13* 
males 0.42171 0.43382 2.5 0.74 0.459 . 
construction 0.21331 0.2252 2.9 0.87 0.385 . 
retail 0.13257 0.12801 1.3 0.41 0.682 . 
finance 0.05019 0.04495 2 0.75 0.456 . 
age >55 0.27778 0.27325 1.9 0.6 0.551 1.07 
age <25 0.06401 0.06508 1.2 0.37 0.714 0.91* 
 
 
